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Title
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An Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Natural-Gas Distribution
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Sub-Title |
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Subject |
Gas demand; gas allocation; bankruptcy problem; Nash bargaining theory
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Sub-Subject |
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Author |
Shahmir Janjua 1,†, Muhammad Umair Ali 2,† , Karam
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Publish Year |
2022 |
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Diss#. |
https://doi.org/10.3390/ app12115677 |
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Pages |
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Text Language |
English |
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Accession |
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Library Section |
Research Article |
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Abstract |
For the sustainable socio-economic growth, the energy supply is one of the foundations for
any country. The gas shortage is one of the most significant impediments to any emerging country’s
economic progress, making it a contested and disputed resource. In the middle of a supply–demand
mismatch, distributing limited available gas across administrative units/provinces with competing
requirements is a key challenge. In this work, an asymmetric gas allocation bargaining model is
proposed under gas shortage to resolve natural gas-related disputes among Pakistan’s administrative
units/provinces. Each administrative unit/province is characterized by its gas demand. Results show
that the Nash bargaining theory, when applied under equal and bargaining weights, can address the
supply–demand mismatches of the gas sector in Pakistan. Such an approach could help policymakers
to make a fair gas-supply management system during gas shortage periods and would help in
resolving the disputes between the
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